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NOTES

Tissue Tug-of-War: A Comparison
of
International
and
U.S.
Perspectives on the Regulation of
Human Tissue Banks
ABSTRACT

Every day in the United States and around the world,
patients and research participants at hospitals and doctors'
offices give biologicalsamples, whether in the form of surgically
removed cancer tissue or a routine blood sample. Many of these
patients are entirely unaware that their tissues were not thrown
out as hazardous waste, and instead used by scientists for the
development of new drugs and therapies. The courts in the
United States in Moore v. Regents of the University of
California, Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research
Institute, and most recently Washington University v. Catalona
have determined that a patient does not retain rights to his
tissues once they are removed, regardlessof whether the patient
consented to this forfeiture of rights.
This Note argues that the United States' regulations and
common law developments are simply inadequate to achieve the
appropriatebalance between protectingpatients' autonomy and
further promoting scientific research. Sweden, Iceland, and
Denmark have made greater strides in protecting these basic
human tenets in the context of tissue banks through the
implementation of comprehensive nationalpolicies. The United
States should look to these nations for guidance in forming its
own uniform national policy, as our current legal landscape
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regulating tissue banks will remain fragmented so long as it
develops out of sporadic common law precedents. A legislatively
enacted nationwide legal structure would help ensure a uniform
approach among courts addressing tissue bank issues and aid
in striking an appropriate balance between the recognition of
patients' rights and the promotion of scientific research.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Patients and research participants at hospitals and doctors'
offices around the world give biological samples every day, whether in
the form of surgically removed cancer tissue or a routine blood
sample. According to a recent report, more than 307 million tissue
samples from more than 178 million people are stored in the United
States, and the number of samples is growing by 20 million each
year.' The number of samples from patients around the world is
surely even greater, although the exact number is presently
unknown. 2 Doctors and scientists perform every type of imaginable
research from these samples of human tissue, often extracting the
DNA from the cells for examination. 3 There is nothing that defines a
person at a more basic level than his or her specific genes. Many of
these patients, however, are entirely unaware that their tissues were
not thrown out as hazardous waste. 4 Although every hospital
requires patients to sign some type of informed consent form, these
forms are not uniform and are virtually unregulated. Thus, patients
are generally left with little, if any, information about how their
samples will be used or who might be using them. 5 Scientists depend
on these tissues to develop new drugs and therapy techniques, and
6
without these samples would not be able to do so.
Only a limited number of cases in the United States have
addressed the issue of whether a patient or research subject retains
any right to his tissue once it has been removed at a doctor's office or
hospital. Moore v. Regents of the University of California,7 Greenberg
v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute,8 and most recently
Washington University v. Catalona9 have implemented the standard
that a patient does not retain rights to his tissues once they are

1.
Rebecca Skloot, Taking the Least of You, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 16, 2006, at
38 (citing a 1999 RAND study). Skloot further explains that these samples are taken
from "routine medical tests, operations, clinical trials and research donations." Id.
2.
Medicine's New CentralBankers, ECONOMIST, Dec. 10, 2005, at 29.
3.
Skloot, supra note 1, at 2.
4.
See id. (noting that this lack of awareness is particularly true in regard to
the after-life of blood samples and other excised tissues).
5.
See id. at 10 ("Some institutions ... ask permission to keep tissues and let
patients specify what research their samples will be used for. But others don't.").
6.
For example, not only drug companies want human tissue samples to aid in
drug discovery, but public health officials, epidemiologists, and disease advocacy
groups hope to use such tissue samples to more efficiently identify disease patterns and
aid in research for beneficial disease-specific therapies. See Medicine's New Central
Bankers, supra note 2, at 29.
7.
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 936 (1991).
8.
Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064
(S.D. Fla. 2003).
9.
Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007).
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removed, regardless of whether the patient consented to this
forfeiture of rights. 10 In Catalona, the District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri found that Washington University owned all the
human tissues in its possession.' The judge determined that neither
Dr. Catalona nor his patients held any proprietary or ownership
rights to the patients' tissues, basing this decision primarily on Moore
and Greenberg.12 This decision eroded patients' rights to their tissues
more than the existing case law in two important ways: (1) in
discounting the importance of informed consent, the Catalona court
also stripped patients of any real right to withdraw their sample from
research; and (2) the hospital merely held the samples without using
them, and yet this was sufficient to give the hospital full property
rights to the samples. 13 These legal bases restricting patients'
interests became even more entrenched in recent months, as the
14
Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment in Catalona.
The issues that arise in the context of tissue rights, namely
ownership, informed consent, patient autonomy, and a patient's right
to withdraw, have otherwise remained mostly untouched by the
United States courts and state and federal legislatures. The federal
regulations governing the collection of human-subject tissues for
research provide guidance as to informed consent, but leave many
questions unanswered regarding a subject's right to withdraw or
15
otherwise control her tissue samples after the samples are taken.
In contrast to the United States government's relative inaction,
many countries have addressed issues surrounding human tissuebanking through developments in their emerging common law and
through the legislative process. These developments provide model
mechanisms for the appropriate allocation of property rights and
informed consent requirements for patients who either knowingly or
unknowingly provide tissue samples. 16 Sweden, for example, places
high value on the patients' rights and autonomy. For example, it is
one of the only nations with specific tissue-banking regulations, and

10.
Although neither Moore nor Greenbergare binding on the 8th Circuit, both
the district court and 8th Circuit court cite to these cases for support and use the same
reasoning to reach very similar conclusions. See id. (citing Moore and Greenberg).
11.
Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1002 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
12.
Id. at 995.
13.
See Lori Andrews, Who Owns Your Body? A Patient's Perspective on
Washington University v. Catalona, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 398 (2006) (comparing
Catalona to Moore where at least the doctor and university used and developed the
samples in some way and the patient claimed a right in the resulting cell line the
doctor had derived).
14.
See Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (affirming the district court's decision, which
limited patients' interests).
15.
See infra Part I.A (discussing the current federal regulations governing
human tissue collection and treatment of human subjects).

16.

See, e.g., Medicine's New Central Bankers, supra note 2, at 29 (discussing

the use of biobanks).
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its consent requirements are very strict. 11 Additionally, Denmark
allows individuals who gave required blood samples at birth to
demand the return of their tissue samples.' 8 In Iceland, both the
courts and the legislature have addressed human tissue-banking,
requiring that the source of the human tissue retain an interest in
her tissue and maintain control over its future use, even if the tissue
is given anonymously or at any point is changed to an anonymous
sample. 19 Furthermore, various international bodies, such as the
Council of Europe, have adopted lower standards than the nations
described above, yet still offer innovative solutions to these issues of
20
ownership, consent, and autonomy.
Parts II and III provide a comprehensive background of both the
regulations and common law decisions addressing patients' rights to
their removed tissues, and the way in which informed consent
requirements have played a role in these rights. Part III emphasizes
the current landscape of these issues in the United States as revealed
by the Catalonadecision, and the potential policy implications of that
Part IV analyzes the
particular common law development.
approaches to patients' legal rights to their tissue samples in Sweden,
Iceland, and Denmark. Part IV also discusses the perspective of the
Council of Europe, an international regulatory body.
Part V argues that current United States property law and
analyses of informed consent are ill-equipped to adequately address a
patient's claims to her excised tissues held in a tissue bank, arguing
that Catalona should have been decided on grounds broader than the
narrow property analysis used and affirmed by federal courts in the
Eighth Circuit. In order to further patients' rights, the United States
should adopt national regulations incorporating aspects from the
models of property rights, informed consent, and tissue withdrawal
protocols from countries around the world. Part V reveals the
greatest problems in the current system and potential deficiencies
that may arise should various models be adopted in the United
States. Finally, this Part suggests a charitable trust model as a

17.
Sweden Takes Steps to Protect Tissue Banks, 286 SCI. 894 (1999).
18.
Nordic Committee on Bioethics, Biolaw Update: Legislation on
Biotechnology
in
the
Nordic
Countries,
Table
7:
Biobanks,
http://www.ncbio.orgbiolawupdate/table7.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2008) [hereinafter
Nordic Table 7].
19.
See, e.g., Remigius N. Nwabueze, The Concept of Sepulchral Rights in
Canada and the U.S. in the Age of Genomics: Hints From Iceland, 31 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 217 (2005); J. Wolter Oosterhuis et al., Tumour Banks: Wellguarded Treasures in the Interest of Patients, 3 NATURE REV. 73 (2003).
20.
Barbara Indech, The International Harmonization of Human Tissue
Regulation: Regulatory Control Over Human Tissue Use and Tissue Banking in Select
Countries and the Current State of International Harmonization Efforts, 55 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 343 (2000).
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potential solution to protect tissue providers' dignity, autonomy, and
self-determination.

II. BACKGROUND OF REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES IN THE
UNITED STATES REGARDING PROPERTY RIGHTS TO HUMAN
TISSUES AND PATIENTS' INFORMED CONSENT

Doctors and researchers obtaining tissues from patients and
volunteer subjects must follow a number of federal, state, and
professional requirements. Several federal agencies have adopted a
set of regulations known as the "Common Rule," which provides
mechanisms to ensure that the necessary informed consent is
obtained from human research subjects. 21 These regulations apply to
any recipient of research funds from any one of eighteen federal
agencies and also to any recipient of private funds directed toward
22
clinical research on federally regulated drugs or medical devices.
Furthermore, several states require additional protections for human
23
research subjects either through legislation or court rulings.
Professional guidelines and legal frameworks provide a final layer of
24
regulation of human tissue collection and patient informed consent.
A. FederalRegulations
The Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects,
referred to as the "Common Rule," regulates any federally funded
research involving human subjects. 25 The requirements of the
Common Rule attach to research funding received from eighteen
different federal departments and agencies. 26 This federal rule
requires that two mechanisms be implemented to ensure appropriate
human-subject research: (1) informed consent and (2) Institutional
Review Boards (IRBs).2 7 Informed consent allows patients and
research subjects to be supplied with all the relevant information

21.
Paul E. Kalb & Kristin Graham Koehler, Legal Issues in Scientific
Research, 287 J. AM. MED. AsS'N 85 (2002).
22.
Id. at 87.
23.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
24.
See discussion infra Part II.C.
25.
Barbara J. Evans & Eric M. Meslin, Encouraging TranslationalResearch
Through Harmonization of FDA and Common Rule Informed Consent Requirements for
Research with Banked Specimens, 27 J. LEGAL MED. 119, 121 (2006).
26.
See id. at 120 (explaining that although the FDA has not implemented the
Common Rule, the FDA regulations and the Common Rule impose the same
requirements in research involving human subjects and when individuals knowingly
contribute their tissues to research specifically).
27.
Daniel S. Strouse, Informed Consent to Genetic Research on Banked Human
Tissue, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 135, 136 (2005).

2008]

TISSUE TUG-OF-WAR

they need to make an autonomous decision to participate in the
research. 28 IRBs must be put in place so as to review and monitor the
human-subject research at each IRB's respective institution.
Pursuant to the Common Rule, each IRB is responsible for
monitoring proper administration of the informed consent process,
ensuring risk to human subjects is minimized, and determining that
the benefits of the research outweigh the potential risks to the
research subjects. 29 Prior to the start of any given research pursuit,
30
the IRB must determine that the research is ethically permissible.
Additionally, it is within the scope of the IRB's obligations to continue
to monitor the conduct of ongoing research even after it has been
approved by the research subject with the appropriate informed
consent. 31 Thus, the IRB ensures both adequate substantive research
as well as an appropriate consent process.
In addition to the IRB requirements, the Common Rule also sets
forth the elements necessary for adequate informed consent. Notably,
the Common Rule requires scientists to inform human research
participants that their participation is voluntary, and that they may
withdraw from the research procedures at any time. 32
The
information must be given to each research subject in language
understandable to her. 33
Furthermore, "[n]o informed consent,
whether oral or written may include any exculpatory language
through which the subject or the representative is made to waive or
appear to waive any of the subject's legal rights, or releases or
appears to release the investigator, the sponsor, the institution or its
'34
agents from liability for negligence.
Not only does the Common Rule require the exclusion of
exculpatory language from an adequate informed consent, but the
Rule also requires an explanation of the risks, nature, purpose, and
duration of the research. 35 Another element of informed consent is
the research subject's ability to withdraw from the research. 36 Under
the Common Rule, "refusal to participate will involve no penalty or
loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled, and the

28.
See id. at 138 ("The cardinal value advanced by informed consent to
research is regard for autonomy.").
29.
45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-46.409 (2007); see also Jon F. Merz et al., IRB Review
and Consent in Human Tissue Research, 283 SCi. 1647 (1999) (discussing "the degree to
which published studies involving human tissues document IRB approval and informed
consent").
30.
45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1)-(2).
31.
Id. §§ 46.109(e), 46.111(a)(6).
32.
Id. § 46.116(a).
33.
Id. § 46.116.
34.

Id.

35.
36.

Id.
Id. § 46.116(b)(4).
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subject may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or
37
loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled.
Despite the Common Rule's stringent requirements for obtaining
appropriate informed consent of the subject, a few exceptions are also
set forth. Consent from the subject may be waived where the IRB
determines the research poses only a minimal risk to human subjects
and does not adversely impact subjects' rights, when the research
could not be performed without waivers.3 8 As an additional exception
to the Common Rule requirements, researchers may anonymize the
human tissue samples taken from the research subjects in lieu of
obtaining informed consent as described above; anonymous tissues
are exempt from the requirements of the Common Rule.3 9 A tissue is
anonymized if all identifiers and links to the specific subject are
removed. 40
However, there is evidence that not all research
practitioners skirting Common Rule requirements through the above
exceptions do so properly. One study found that researchers using
human tissue samples without consent or IRB approval were more
likely to use samples in an identifiable form rather than in the proper
41
anonymized form.
The Common Rule sometimes lacks clarity and is not without
areas of weakness. The first significant problem with the application
of the Common Rule is that it is intended to govern humans, not their
excised tissues. 42 Thus, it is unclear whether it should even apply to
human tissues. Second, the Common Rule does not address a
research participant's right to physically possess his samples on
termination of further involvement in the research. Nor does the
Rule mention whether a subject has the right to direct or transfer
samples.
The United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) may
require a tissue donor's informed consent where the Common Rule
does not require it. 43 Since research that may have initially been
governed by the Common Rule could ultimately result in therapies or
treatments which require FDA approval, studies and the resulting
44
data may fall short of the FDA's informed consent requirements.

37.
Id. § 46.116(a)(8).
38.
Merz et al., supra note 29.
39.
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (describing informed consent).
40.
See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 992 n.10 (E.D. Mo. 2006)
("To 'anonymize' a sample, all links to the [research participant's] personal identifying
data is removed and the sample is no longer 'linked' to a particular [research
participant].").
41.
See Merz et al., supra note 29 (revealing that of "13 studies performed
without consent or IRB approval, only 3... used nonidentified samples").
42.
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (describing informed consent, which demonstrates
that the Common Rule's focus is on making sure a human knows his or her rights).
43.
Evans & Meslin, supranote 25, at 121.
44.
Id.

2008]

TISSUE TUG-OF-WAR

For research on products regulated by the FDA, researchers must
comply with informed consent and IRB review set forth in FDA
regulations, which do not contain an exemption for anonymized
45
tissues akin to that of the Common Rule.
B. State Laws
Although individual states must adhere to federal regulations,
many states have enacted additional protections for patients and
their rights to their banked tissues. 46 New York, Maryland, and
Virginia have extended the Common Rule to any research performed
within their respective state borders. 47 Therefore, researchers in
these states must comply with the Common Rule's requirements for
informed consent and IRBs not only when their research is federally
funded, but also when the research is state or privately funded.
A few states have even created laws that establish a tissue
donor's express property right in her tissue. 48 In response to the
California Supreme Court's ruling in Moore, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, and Louisiana enacted laws making genetic information
personal property of the individual, even though the Moore holding is
not binding outside of California. 49 Taken one step further, it is
possible that if a patient has a property right in her genetic
information, she may therefore retain a right in any extracted tissues
placed in a tissue bank for research. Oregon decided to make genetic
information the private property of the person who provided the
tissue in its Genetic Privacy Act of 1999.50 The state legislature,
however, rescinded this new property right in 2001 because scientists
became increasingly concerned that such a right would negatively
51
impact the progress of research in the state.

45.
21 C.F.R. §§ 50.1, 56.101 (2007).
46.
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(0 (permitting state laws to impose additional
duties).
47.
A.J. Baeyens et al., The Use of Human Biological Samples in Research: A
Comparisonof the Laws in the United States and Europe, 5 BIO-ScI. L. REV. 155 (2003).
Gary E. Marchant, Property Rights and Benefit-Sharing for DNA Donors?,
48.
45 JURIMETRICS J. 153, 160 (2005) ("A few states have enacted laws that expressly
recognize the property rights of a DNA donor.").
49.
Baeyens et al., supra note 47; see also Marchant, supra note 48, at 160-61
(describing state laws that have been enacted in Oregon, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
and Louisiana).
50.
See Marchant, supra note 48, at 160 ("Oregon's Genetic Privacy Act of 1999
was the first to declare that genetic information was the private property of the
individual from whom the DNA was taken.").
51.
Id.

648

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 41:639

C. Professionaland Legal Guidelines
In deciding who owns a patient's tissues once they are excised,
courts may look to professional and legal guidelines for direction, as
precedent on the issue is sparse. The American Medical Association
(AMA), the largest association of medical doctors in the United
States, seeks to promote medicine, science, and the improvement of
public health. 52 In its guidelines on the Commercial Use of Human
Tissues, the AMA has stated that the "rapid growth of the
biotechnology industry has resulted in the commercial availability of
numerous therapeutic and other products developed from human
tissue. '53 The AMA proposes that doctors obtain informed consent
54
from patients in order to use patients' tissues in clinical research.
Additionally, the AMA prohibits use of human tissue for commercial
purposes without the patient's informed consent, allowing for profit
sharing between patient and doctor should there be a lawful
contract. 55 These guidelines, however, do not necessarily fill in the
gaps left under the Common Rule regarding a research participant's
relationship and rights to any excised tissues.
The Restatement (Second) of Property provides a donor the right
to give personal property to another person (donee) as a gift and yet
retain some reversionary interest in the property. 56 This section of
the Restatement allows the donor to retain such an interest by
"delivering the property to the donee, or to a third person for the
donee, with the manifest intention that the donee acquire an
ownership interest in the property that terminates a after the
passage of some specified period of time or upon the occurrence or
nonoccurrence of some event or condition. '57 According to this
provision, a patient who "donates" his tissue for use in research may
convey less than the entire interest in the property, retaining a
58
reversionary interest in the donated tissue.
According to the Corpus Juris Secundum (CJS), the elements of
an inter vivos gift are: (1) the donor's intention to make a gift to
another person; (2) delivery of the property by the donor to the donee
or a third party for the donee; and (3) an acceptance by the donee

52.
See American Medical Association, AMA Mission, http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/category/1815.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2008) (noting specifically
the AMA's pursuit to unite medical professionals across the nation to shape public
policy surrounding medical issues).
53.
American Medical Association, E-2.08 Commercial Use of Human Tissue,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8427.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.

(1992).
57.
58.

RESTATEMENT

Id.
Id. cmt. a.

(SECOND)

OF

PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS)

§

31.2
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which completes the gift.5 9 CJS also explains that an inter vivos gift
must be absolute with respect to the immediate vesting of ownership
in the donee once the elements have been met. 60 However, "a
condition or qualification, not inconsistent with the vesting of title,
does not necessarily render a gift invalid."'61 Therefore, although a
research participant may not donate her tissue reserving the right to
revoke it entirely, it is possible to permissibly attach conditions to the
giving of her tissue.

III.

ANALYSIS: UNITED STATES COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENTS

While federal and state guidelines attempt to address the
adequacy of informed consent by implementing regulations such as
the Common Rule, it is the courts that have been left the task of
allocating property rights in patients' excised tissues. Although many
of the common law developments regarding tissue rights draw on the
property law frameworks described above, the unique factual context
of excised human tissue has resulted in a separate body of law all its
own. By tracing the property rights to one's body parts from a
historical perspective through the most recent developments in
Catalona,the inadequacies in the U.S. approach become apparent.

A. HistoricalPropertyRights in One's Body Parts
The concept that one owns her property and has the right to
restrict another's access to that property is deeply rooted in the
framework of property law. 62 A property interest is commonly viewed
as a "bundle of rights" that the owner retains with respect to the
property, defining the ways in which an owner can include or exclude
a
others from her property interest. 63 When a person's tissue is still 64
tissue.
that
owns
individual
the
that
clear
is
it
body,
her
part of
However, the courts have struggled throughout history to define the

38A C.J.S. Gifts § 11 (2007); see also Washington Univ. v. Catalona, 493
59.
F.3d 667, 674 (8th Cir. 2007) (relying on these same elements as adopted in Clippard v.
Pfefferkorn, 168 S.W.3d 616, 618 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)).
38A C.J.S. Gifts § 37.
60.
Id.; cf. 38A C.J.S. Gifts § 40 ("The reservation of a power of revocation is
61.
inconsistent with the absolute character of a gift inter vivos, and a gift with such
reservation is void.").
62.
See, e.g., Sonia M. Suter, DisentanglingPrivacy from Property: Toward a
Deeper Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 751-52 (2004)
(emphasizing the power to restrict others as an important aspect of the evolution of
property law).
Id. at 752.
63.
Skloot, supra note 1, at 2.
64.
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set of rights given either to a person who has voluntarily parted with
65
her tissue or to the person or entity that holds another's tissue.
In the early twentieth century, English and Australian common
law provided only a limited set of rights to people claiming they had a
property interest in a human body after death. 66 An Australian court
in 1904 established that a man in a traveling freak show owned the
67
two-headed stillborn child he had acquired for display in the show.
Although the police had confiscated the child's body, the man claimed
in court that the body belonged to him, and the judge agreed,
determining that if a corpse or body part had been altered for science
or medicine, then it necessarily acquired value as property. 68 The
judge came to this conclusion because he realized that if he found
that this man had no right to own the stillborn child, museums,
archaeologists, and medical schools would similarly have no right to
69
own the bodies they had acquired.
In England, however, other people could hold property rights to a
person's body despite the fact that a property right in one's own body
did not exist under the law. 70 For example, one dead man's body was
arrested while being transported to his funeral and given to his
creditors as payment for his debts. 71 Moreover, in the feudal era, it
was a crime to mutilate one's body parts because this left an
individual less capable of fighting for the king.72 Lingering hesitation
to commodify tissues persists today because of the worry that people
would then be reduced to an economic value, which many consider
73
morally unacceptable in modern society.
In addition to the historical notion of a property interest in
human bodies and body parts, informed consent has always been a
fundamental principle in scientific research and ethics. 74 People can
always refuse to participate in research, no matter how small the risk
75
to them and how great the potential benefit to the community.
When patients choose not to participate in research, they retain the
rights to their tissues, making the property claims of others clearly

65.
Id.
66.
Lucinda Hahn, Owning a Piece of Jonathan, CHI. MAG., May 2003.
67.
Doodeward v. Spence (1908) 6 C.L.R. 406 (Austl.).
68.
Hahn, supra note 66.
69.
Id.
70.
Andrews, supra note 13, at 400.
71.
Id.
72.
See id. (explaining that such understandings likely were based upon the
idea that one's body and parts belonged to the king rather than the concept that the
body is sacred).
73.
Cf. Lori B. Andrews, Harnessingthe Benefits of Biobanks, 33 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 22, 27 (2005) ("In mainstream U.S. culture, however, there are already
precedents for payment for tissue and no cultural ban against it.").
74.
See id. ("A basic tenet of research law and ethics is that research should not
be undertaken without the subject's consent.").
75.
Id.
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illegitimate. Problems emerge here, however, when the situation
involves pieces of tissue that the patient parts with intending to have
them tested in a pathology lab. In such a situation, the patient has
relinquished her tissue for a broad purpose, likely without having
76
contemplated the scope of future uses.
B. Moore v. Regents of University of California
The United States court system first addressed the notion of a
patient's property interest in his donated tissue sample when the
California Supreme Court ruled in Moore v. Regents of University of
Californiain 1990.77 This landmark case arose after John Moore was
diagnosed with "hairy-cell leukemia, a rare cancer that filled his
spleen with malignant blood cells."78s
Moore's doctor, a cancer
researcher at U.C.L.A., removed Moore's spleen, blood, and other
tissue to eradicate the cancer. 79 The doctor used Moore's rare cells to
develop and subsequently patent a valuable cell line without Moore's
knowledge.8 0 Moore alleged that the doctor did not inform him that
his excised cells would be used for commercial purposes, nor did
Moore give his consent to his doctor for such uses.8 1 Moore argued
that he retained a property right in his tissue samples, and
consequently, in the cell lines derived from those tissues.8 2 This
property claim over human tissue was the first such claim ruled upon
83
in the United States court system.
On appeal, the California Supreme Court determined as a
matter of law that Moore retained no property interest in his excised
tissues and resulting cell line.8 4 Any property interest Moore had in
his tissues disappeared when the doctor removed the tissue, despite
85
the fact that Moore had not given consent for the doctor's research.
The court worried that if patients had a property right in their

76.
See generally Strouse, supra note 27 (identifying the problem of how
researchers can possibly obtain fully informed consent of the patient where possible
future research uses of the patient's tissue are unknown at the time the tissue sample
is taken).
77.
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 936 (1991).
78.
Skloot, supra note 1, at 3.
79.
Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.
80.
Id. at 481-82; see also Skloot, supra note 1, at 4 (revealing that the doctor
had entered into agreements with a biotech company to further develop the cell line
and the market value of this cell line was predicted to near three billion dollars).
81.
Moore further claimed that the researchers acted in unethical and
misleading ways in order to continue obtaining more tissue samples for this research
without telling Moore. See Marchant, supra note 48, at 156-57.
82.
Moore, 793 P.2d at 487-95.
83.
Skloot, supra note 1, at 4-5.
84.
Id. at 5.
85.
Moore, 793 P.2d at 493.
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removed tissues, it would impede scientific progress because of the
burden placed on scientists to ensure every cell line used in their
research had the appropriate consent.8 6 According to the court, a
ruling in favor of Moore could potentially "destroy the economic
incentive to conduct important medical research,"8 7 and that as a
result, "with every cell sample, a researcher purchases a ticket in the
'8 8
litigation lottery.
The court determined that Moore had a valid claim that the
researchers had failed to obtain his informed consent because the
researchers had not disclosed their interest in his cells for research
and potential financial gain.8 9 Furthermore, the court found that a
patient does, in fact, have some limited right to his tissues because so
long as he is fully informed, he may withhold consent for the research
if he does not approve. 90 However, the court did not find that this
right extended to a patient's retention of a comprehensive property
interest in the resulting cell line. 91 Instead, the court encouraged the
legislature to determine the patient's property interest in his removed
tissues, admitting the current lack of regulation regarding consent
92
and ownership.
The impact of the decision in Moore leaves patients without any
ownership rights to their excised tissues, even if a court finds the
patient's consent to particular future uses inadequate. Although the
California ruling is not binding in any other state, Moore is often
cited outside California for the legal standard that courts will not
recognize a property right for tissue donors. 93 In the two decades
since this decision, no court has found that donors hold a property
right in their genetic material, though courts have rarely had the
opportunity to address the issue. 94 The irony in the impact of this
decision is that the policy concerns the Moore court set forth to bolster
its reasoning-namely, that giving a tissue donor property rights in
her tissues would inhibit medical research because donors would
limit researchers' access to their tissues-has had quite the opposite
effect. 95 Instead of preventing tissue commodification, "[the Moore

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
Greenberg
2003).
95.

Id. at 493-95.
Id. at 495.
Id. at 495-96.
Id.
Id. at 491-92.
Id. at 494-96.
Id. at 496.
Skloot, supra note 1, at 7.
See, e.g., Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006);
v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla.
Skloot, supra note 1, at 6.
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decision] just took patients out of the equation and emboldened
'96
scientists to commodify tissues in increasing numbers.
C. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute
The Greenbergs were the parents of two children who had
Canavan disease, a rare inherited brain disorder that kills the child
within the first several years of life. 97 In 1987, the Greenbergs
persuaded a genetic researcher to locate the Canavan gene, and they
routinely provided samples of their children's blood and tissues for
this research over the next several years. 98 Yet the parents never
once gave any form of written consent during a decade of this
research.9 9 The parents hoped that if the Canavan gene was found,
the result would provide affordable access to the research, widespread
prevention and screening techniques, and ultimately a cure for the
disease.' 0 0 According to the Greenbergs, the researcher eventually
located the Canavan gene and patented the gene without informing
them. 10 1 The Greenbergs sued the researcher and his affiliated
institution for unlawful conversion of their property, lack of informed
consent, unjust enrichment, and fraudulent concealment of the
patent. 10 2 However, the court dismissed all claims except the unjust
03
enrichment claim.'
Similar to the ruling in Moore, the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of Florida dismissed the conversion of property
claim.' 0 4 The Greenberg court found that because a tissue donor no
longer retains a property right in her tissue samples once she
voluntarily gives the sample to a third party, the Greenbergs retained
neither a property right to the tissues nor any rights to the research
derived from the tissues. 10 5 According to the court, researchers had

96.
Id.
97.
Kevin L.J. Oberdorfer, The Lessons of Greenberg: Informed Consent and the
Protection of Tissue Sources'ResearchInterests, 93 GEO. L.J. 365, 373 (2004).
98.
Hahn, supra note 66; Oberdorfer, supra note 97, at 373.
99.
In 1994, the hospital sent the Greenbergs an informed consent form, but
nowhere in this consent form did the researcher disclose his intent to use the tissue
samples for potential commercial purposes by patenting the Canavan gene. See Hahn,
supra note 66.
100.
See Oberdorfer, supra note 97, at 375 (pointing out that no evidence exists
demonstrating that the Greenbergs ever actually conveyed this vision to the
researchers).
101.
Id. at 375-76.
102.
Id.
103.
The Greenbergs won on the unjust enrichment claim because they invested
time and significant resources into the research. See Greenberg v. Miami Children's
Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1073 (S.D. Fla. 2003). The Greenbergs
received an undisclosed settlement from this lawsuit. Skloot, supra note 1, at 7.
104.
Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
105.
Id.
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no continued duty to disclose all information to patients who at one
time submitted tissues because such disclosure would impede science,
similar to the court's policy-based reasoning in Moore. The court
simply considered the tissue as donations to research without any
expectation for return at a later time, and therefore determined that
10 6
the Greenbergs retained no right in the tissues.
According to the Greenberg court's reasoning, no liability should
attach for a doctor's failure to disclose to the patient her commercial
intentions of tissue sample research.
This analysis effectively
restricts patients' rights to a greater degree than the Moore
decision.107 Furthermore, although the Greenberg decision is not
binding, it has been used in subsequent decisions such as Catalona,
demonstrating the emerging nationwide acceptance of this framework
to determine researchers' rights to removed tissues and patients' loss
of rights to those same tissues.
D. The Latest Development: Washington University v. Catalona
Washington University v. Catalonarepresents the latest common
law development in tissue rights. Drawing heavily from the Moore
and Greenberg decisions (which were merely persuasive and not
binding authority on the court), the case was questionably decided
with regard to both the property interest ruling and the informed
consent ruling. Nonetheless, after the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
District Court ruling in June, 2007, Catalona stands as the
preeminent decision regarding tissue rights in the United States.
1.

The Story of Six Thousand Loyal Patients

This unique lawsuit arose from Dr. Catalona's continued
commitment to cancer research and to his patients, who in turn
remained loyal to their doctor and researcher. Dr. Catalona, a
preeminent surgeon and researcher of prostate cancer at Washington
University in St. Louis, Missouri, had helped to establish a tissue
bank at the University to collect and store biological research
materials he obtained from his patients in his prostate cancer
surgeries.' 08 Over several years, Dr. Catalona had collected over
thirty thousand tissue samples from patients willing to help him in

106.
Id.
107
Cf. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (finding
that Moore's physician's failure to disclose his research and economic interests violated
Moore's rights to make an informed decision).
108.
Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006). The tissue
bank held biological samples of prostate tissue, blood, and DNA for the purpose of
prostate cancer research. Id.
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this endeavor.1 0 9 In 2003, Dr. Catalona accepted a prostate cancer
research position at another university and informed his patients of
this transition. 110 He asked them for permission to transfer their
samples to the new university for his continued research, and six
thousand patients wrote back to him stating explicitly that they
wanted their samples to transfer with him."' Notably, Dr. Catalona
also informed his patients in this correspondence that he would
continue to provide care to them in his new position should they
12
desire.
Washington University refused to transfer the tissue samples
and sued Dr. Catalona to obtain a permanent injunction to prevent
further attempts by Dr. Catalona or his patients to transfer
tissues. 113 Washington University contended that because they held
the samples over several years, the school-rather than the doctor
who was merely their employee-owned them. 114
Washington
University claimed that it legally owned the patients' extracted
tissues because the patients had donated them as gifts when they
signed the University's informed consent forms. 115 However, Dr.
Catalona and the patients argued that the patients had not given
their tissues unconditionally to the University. 116 Rather, several of
the patients testified during the trial that they had signed forms at
the time the tissue samples were taken with the original intention of
giving Dr. Catalona-not Washington University-their donated
17
samples.
Furthermore, the patients claimed that the informed consent
forms they had signed did not demonstrate the giving of
unconditional gifts because the forms gave patients the right to
withdraw from the research at any time. and have their samples
destroyed."l 8 The patients understood this right to include "the right
to continue control over the use and location of their excised biological
materials." 119 Therefore, the patients argued that Dr. Catalona

109.
See Andrews, supra note 13, at 398 (emphasizing Dr. Catalona's consistent
successes in his research including the FDA approval of the commonly used PSA
(prostate-specific antigen) test and improvement on existing tests for the detection of
prostate cancer).
110.
Id. at 399.
111.
Transcript of Record at 1:26, Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985
(E.D. Mo. Apr. 11, 2005) (No. 4:03CV1065SNL).
112.
Id.
113.
Catalona,437 F. Supp. 2d at 985.
114.
Id. at 986.
115.
Andrews, supranote 13, at 399.
116.
Post Hearing Brief for Defendant at 7-11, Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F.
Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (No. 4:03CV1065SNL) [hereinafter Post Hearing Brief].
117.

Id.

118.
119.

Id.
Catalona,437 F. Supp. 2d at 999.

656

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 41:639

should be allowed to take the samples with him to his new university
because they retained a right to direct where their tissues should go.
Washington University responded that each patient's right to
withdraw from the research did not include the right to withdraw the
sample itself, and researchers had the right to simply anonymize the
samples if consent was withdrawn. 12 0 The University explained that
there were only three things that could happen when a patient
decided to terminate participation: "(1) [the University] may destroy
the sample; (2) [the University] may store the sample indefinitely
without any further use; or (3) [the University] may remove all
identifying markers and use the sample in exempt 'anonymized'
research.' 1 21 The process of anonymizing a sample consists of
stripping the sample of any identification, thus removing all
connections to any human being. 122
According to Washington
University, transferring or returning the sample to the patient who
has withdrawn participation in the research is not a recognized
option.
2.

The District Court's Findings

The district court ruled in favor of Washington University,
finding that the University owned all the patients' "donated" tissue
samples, and that neither Dr. Catalona nor his patients held any
proprietary interest in these samples. 12 3 In regard to the issue of
ownership, the court positioned the primary issue in the case as
whether the research participants retained rights to direct or transfer
their biological tissues to a third party after having "donated" the
tissue to a research institution. 124 The court held that the University
owned all the tissues in their tissue bank because they housed them
in their facility, paid for the tissue bank's maintenance and
administration, and raised the necessary funding to hold the
tissues. 125 Because the patients never had access to their tissues once
put in the tissue bank, the court determined that the University had
exclusive control over the tissues. 126 The court acknowledged the lack
of legal precedent guiding the court in its decision, yet based its
finding entirely on the non-binding decisions of Moore and Greenberg,

120.
See id. at 990 ("[Tlhe typical WU informed consent form states that '[y]our
participation is voluntary and you may choose not to participate in this research study
or withdraw your consent at any time.' Some forms use the phrase 'withdraw my
consent and discontinue participation."').
121.
Id. at 999.
122.
Andrews, supra note 13, at 399.
123.
Catalona,437 F. Supp. 2d at 1002-03.
124.
Id. at 997.
125.
Id. at 994-95.
126.
Id.
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both of which "concluded that research participants retain no
ownership of biological materials they contribute for medical
127
research."'
The court further agreed with Washington University in regard
to informed consent and the patients' autonomy.
The court
considered the patients as "donors" giving their tissues as inter vivos
gifts. 128 To constitute an inter vivos gift under the law, only the
129
elements of donative intent, delivery, and acceptance are required.
Despite patient testimony indicating intent to give tissue to Dr.
Catalona specifically, 130 the court discounted Dr. Catalona's
argument that the patients' intent was to retain rights in their
tissues, not donate them to the University, at the time they signed
the consent form. l 3 ' Nonetheless, the court held that the patients had
apparently intended to donate their tissues because the forms stated
the word "donation" multiple times and listed the University as the
owner of donated materials. 13 2 The court regarded the patients'
heartfelt testimonies describing their intent to give their tissues to
the doctor who had saved their lives as merely "afterthought[s] of
33
regret" rather than the intent the patients claimed.'
Finally, with respect to the issue of the patients' right to
withdrawal from the research, the court agreed with Washington
University that under the consent forms, the patient simply retains
the right to withdraw himself at any time from further participation
in the research, not that the patient retains any right to control the
sample itself.'3 4 The court found it sufficient that when a patient
withdraws from the research, her sample may be destroyed, stored
indefinitely, or anonymized, as such practices were acceptably
135
implemented in research at the University at the time.
The court briefly addressed the policy concerns behind the
decision in favor of the University. First, the court recognized that
professional standards and "checks and balances" govern the

127.
128.
129.
130.
testimony
University
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 995.
Id. at 997.
Id.
See Post Hearing Brief, supra note 116, at 17 (referring to patients' trial
that they intended the tissue samples to go to Dr. Catalona, not the
specifically).
Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 997.
Id.
Id. at 999 (citations omitted).
See id. at 1000.

The Court finds that the right to discontinue participation in a research project
means nothing more that the [patient] has chosen .. .not to make any more
inter vivos gifts of donated biological materials to [Washington University].
Nothing more can or should be read into this right possessed by the [patients]
at all times.
135.

Id. at 999.
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institutions collecting human tissues for research to ensure proper
adherence. 136 According to the court, private interests and agendas
would only corrupt such standards, allowing monetary agendas to
trump the interests in public health. 137 The court believed that "[i]f
left unregulated and to the whims of a [research patient], these
highly-prized biological materials would become nothing more than
chattel going to the highest bidder. '138
Following the court's
reasoning down its proposed slippery slope, one might imagine a
world where patients would soon be selling excised tissue on E-bay,
threatening the integrity of all human tissue banks because patients
139
could simply move their samples from one bank to another.
Secondly, the court found "[m]ore alarming... the great potential for
prejudicial influences into medical research," 140 as such prejudices
violate the medical profession's ethical codes, which attempt to
promote health benefits to the greater public rather than benefits to
141
selective groups or individuals.
3.

The Eighth Circuit Affirms the District Court

In December 2006, Dr. Catalona's appeal reached the Eight
Circuit Court of Appeals. 142 Reviewing the District Court's ruling
under an abuse of discretion standard, the court affirmed the lower
ruling on June 20, 2007.143 Considering the novelty and importance
of the issue as well as the lack of governing precedent in the context
of tissue rights, the Eighth Circuit deferred to the District Court's
"well-reasoned opinion and judgment" to a surprising degree. 144 The
Eighth Circuit echoed the reasoning of the District Court and labeled
the patients' donations inter vivos gifts under Missouri law.145 In its
only true departure from the District Court opinion, the Eighth
Circuit pointed out that at no point were patients ever informed of
any right to "physically withdraw or request the return of their
biological samples."'1 46 In fact, the court determined that under both

136.
Id. at 1002.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.
139.
See id. ("No longer could research protocols rely on aggregate collections
since individual samples would come and go. Accountability would no longer exist
since institutions would merely be warehouses filling purchase orders.").
140.
See id. (analogizing the concern to a blood donor dictating his blood must be
transfused into an individual of a particular ethnicity and a kidney donor requiring the
recipient to be of a particular gender).
141.
Id.
142.
Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007).
143.
Id. at 677.
144.
Id.
145.
Id. at 673-74.
146.
Id. at 676.
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federal regulation and Missouri statutes, restrictions on the handling
of hazardous wastes meant that such donated samples could not be
withdrawn or returned. 147 This aside only amounts to dicta, however;
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling on the basis of
the same flawed property theory applied by the lower court.
4.

Faults in Both Courts' Reasoning

Although the Catalona court relied heavily on the Moore and
Greenberg decisions, deeper analysis reveals significant factual
differences in those cases which render Catalona distinguishable.
First, in Catalona, the tissues themselves are the property at issue,
not the cell lines or gene sequences derived from those tissues. 148 As
the patients and Dr. Catalona stated themselves, "contrary to Moore
and Greenberg, Patients are not accusing [Washington University] of
improperly converting their property, nor are they attempting to
profit from or control the commercial use or exploitation of new
products developed from their Tissue Samples. 1 49 The patients
recognized that they voluntarily gave their tissues to Dr. Catalona,
not to the University, for use in the doctor's specific research, and
they reserved the right to withdraw their tissue samples at any
point. 150 Conversely, neither the Moore patients nor Greenberg
patients specifically reserved any rights, allowing the court to assume
15 1
a gift was made unconditionally.
Furthermore, unlike the researchers in Moore and Greenberg
who put effort into developing something from the genes for many
years, Washington University did nothing to the patients' tissues but
store them. The Catalona court's reasoning that whoever pays to
house tissues therefore owns them unnecessarily expands the prior
tissue ownership doctrine.
Notably, as the patients and Dr. Catalona revealed to the court,
"nowhere in Greenberg and Moore is it apparent that the extracted
samples at issue in those cases were important [or] even relevant to
152
the plaintiffs, or their families, future health care [and] follow-up.'
The Greenberg court emphasized that the patients' tissue samples
had no therapeutic purpose to the patients, and that the doctors

147.
Id.
148.
See Andrews, supra note 13, at 400 (noting that the patients in Moore and
Greenberg were "trying to control the products made from their tissues, not patients
who claimed ownership of their own tissue itself' as in Catalona).
149.
Post Hearing Brief, supra note 116, at 16.
150.
Id.
151.
See id. (citing Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F.
Supp. 2d 1064, 1074 (S.D. Fla. 2003), and Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793
P.2d 479, 488-89 (Cal. 1990)).
152.
Id. at 17.
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153
obtaining the samples were solely researchers, not clinical doctors.
The court in Moore found that the samples were used "strictly [for]
academic and purely scientific medical research," and that the
patient's excised tissues were not important in his future clinical
treatment. 154 In Catalona,the court similarly found that the tissues
in Washington University's tissue bank were used strictly for
research purposes but not for patient clinical or follow-up care. 155 Yet
this stance overlooks the claims of several individuals and experts
who testified at trial that the samples were used for patient care, not
only for research. 156 Importantly, each sample was "linked" to the
individual from whom it was taken, further demonstrating the
possible future uses to each patient's clinical care as knowledge in
157
research progressed.
Finally, the Catalona court's decision refused to take into
account the potential ramifications of discounting the value of
informed consent and a patient's option of withdrawal from research
as stated in the informed consent form. If a patient participating in
Dr. Catalona's research decided to withdraw, Washington University
could simply anonymize that patient's tissues, allowing further
research to be done without being bound by regulation, as the
patient's identity would essentially be erased in regard to his sample.
However, the court failed to address the fact that tissue can never
truly be anonymous because the tissue still holds DNA. Additionally,
there are further drawbacks to anonymization from both patients'
and researchers' perspectives. The patient who anonymizes her
banked tissue risks that the tissue will be used in research with
which she disagrees. Additionally, the patient and her descendents
will never know the results from research done on the tissue, and
thus cannot benefit from any personal connection to that unique
DNA. The researcher also suffers as a result of tissue anonymization
because the patient's individual characteristics beyond her genetic
material can no longer factor into any research analysis.

IV. INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AND COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENTS

Many nations around the world have enacted regulations
currently preparing future regulations to regulate individuals'
to their tissues once they have been excised and stored in
banks. Expanding biomedical research has recently resulted

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d. at 1070.
Moore, 793 P.2d at 485-86.
Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 989 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
Post Hearing Brief, supranote 116.
Id. at 17.
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increased value of tissue samples, and several countries have
recognized the importance of protecting the dignity, autonomy, and
self-determination of patients who provide their tissues to their
medical professionals and subsequently to tissue banks. Laws have
been promulgated in response to this expansion not only at the
institutional and local levels, but also at regional, national, and more
broadly at international levels.
A. Sweden
Sweden is just one of the many countries that have been
collecting human blood and tissue samples from its citizens for
generations. 158 Specifically, the Karolinska Institute in Stockholm,
one of the largest medical universities in Europe, has been running
one of the world's oldest human tissue banks. 159 The Karolinska
Institute itself claims that the "Swedish health care system is wellintegrated and has a long tradition of storing medical data," and that
its biobanks contain "millions of samples of tissue, blood, serum,
plasma, DNA and other human biological specimens.' 160 Using the
tissue bank, researchers plan to follow 500,000 Swedes for thirty
years to gather valuable information about depression, cancer, and
161
heart disease.
Furthermore, in 1975 Sweden's government established one of
the first nationally-run biobanks, 162 which now contains blood and/or
tissue samples from almost every Swede born since its
establishment. 163 Interestingly, this tissue bank is not anonymous,
meaning that each of its samples remains linked to the person from
whom it was taken. 164 These biobanks, therefore, contain not only
samples, but an abundance of relevant data about the people from
whom the samples were obtained.
Sweden is one of the few countries to institute specific tissuebanking legislation aimed at governing biobanks such as the one

158.
See Medicine's New Central Bankers, supra note 2, at 29 (mentioning that
not only Sweden but also Iceland, Quebec, and Japan have been collecting human
tissues for many years).
159.
Id.
160.
Karolinska
Institutet,
World
Class
Source
of
Knowledge,
http://ki.se/ki/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=7121&a=14493&1=en (last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
161.
Medicine's New Central Bankers, supra note 2, at 29.
162.
Id.
163.
Id.; see Mattias Karen, In Sweden, Biobank Becomes Detective's Tool for
Identifying Bodies in Thailand, Feb. 2, 2005, http://www.signonsandiego.com/
news/world20050203-0126.tsunami-dnadetectives.html
(last visited Feb. 17, 2008)
(describing the privacy concerns surrounding Sweden's use of the tissue samples in its
biobank to identify bodies of citizens who died in the Asian tsunami).
164.
Medicine's New CentralBankers, supra note 2, at 29.
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described above. 165 Similar to the United States Common Rule's
requirements of informed consent and IRB review for the acquisition
of human tissue samples, Sweden requires informed consent and
approval by an ethics committee. 166 The Swedish Biobanks Act of
2002 and the Swedish Ethical Review Act of 2003 expressly called for
scientists collecting tissue samples to obtain donors' explicit informed
consent. 167 More notably, the Biobanks Act adopts a strict approach
where donors must consent to the storage of their tissue once it is no
longer being used in clinical research. Thus, donors must give
separate consent for each different research procedure in which their
tissue may be used.' 6 8 Additionally, any existing tissues in banks
that were obtained without consent are destroyed unless retroactive
consent can be obtained from the donor. 169 According to the Swedish
government, the acquisition of this consent is so important that outof-touch donors must be tracked down even if it requires advertising
in the media. 170 If a particular tissue cannot be identified, however,
the consent requirements of the Biobank Act and the Ethics Review
171
Act do not apply.
The Ethical Review Act also provides for ethics committees to
perform a balancing test in an attempt to protect both the donor as
well as the advancement of scientific research. This Act contains an
important provision which only allows the ethics committee to
approve research where the "risks it entails to the research subject's
health, security, and personal integrity are counterbalanced by its
scientific value."'1 72 Such a balancing of risks and benefits, including
attempts to
protection of the donor's privacy and personal integrity,
173
be more sensitive to the interests of the tissue donors.

165.
166.
167.

Oosterhuis et al., supra note 19, at 76.
Id.
M.G. Hansson, Building on Relationships of Trust in Biobank Research, 31

J. MED. ETHICS 415 (2005).

Oosterhuis et al., supra note 19, at 75; Sweden Takes Steps to Protect
168.
Tissue Banks, supra note 17; see also INSTITUTO DE SALUD CARLOS III, OUTSTANDING
LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES ON BIOBANKS: AN OVERVIEW ON THE REGULATIONS OF
41,
available at
at
PROJECT,
OF THE EUROBIOBANK
STATES
MEMBER

http://www.eurobiobank.org/en/intranet/workflow/uploadDir/PDFmarcadoresEUROBI
OBANK-ING.pdf ('Tissue samples may not ... be collected and stored in a biobank
without the donor being informed about the aim and purpose or purposes for which the
biobank may be used and thereafter giving his or her consent.").
169.
Sweden Takes Steps to Protect Tissue Banks, supra note 17.
See id. ("[1Informed consent is required for each new use of the blood, even
170.
if it means advertising in the press to track down donors who are out of touch.").
Nordic Committee on Bioethics, Legislation on Biotechnology in the Nordic
171.
Countries-An Overview, Table 7: Biobanks, http://www.norden.org/pub/ovrigt/
ovrigt/uk/TN2006506.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Legislation Table 7].
172.
Hansson, supra note 167, at 415.
See id. (noting that because tissue samples will be coded, there is only
173.
minimal risk of violating the donor's privacy).
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Furthermore, the same local ethics committee with publiclyelected members must approve each withdrawal. 174 Under the
Biobank Act and Ethics Review Act, a tissue donor's withdrawal is
unconditional and his samples may either be anonymized or
destroyed. 175
Although withdrawal from research is directly
addressed in the legislation, the situation of a donor wanting to take
back his own tissue sample is not addressed. 176 If the biobank wants
to permanently transfer any tissue samples, it must get approval
17 7
from the National Board of Health and Welfare.
Many experts have been researching and commenting on
Sweden's regulations of informed consent, withdrawal, and the
banking of tissues generally. There is a strong sense of duty to
promote the public good by donating one's tissues in Sweden. One
recent survey of Swedish blood donors to a large biobank concluded
that "a majority of the respondents were willing to waive their right
to informed consent and leave the decision about what kind of
research should be carried out on the stored samples to the ethical
review board.' 178 Swedish citizens appear to have a deep trust of
their government, researchers, and ethical review boards. Such trust
may be the reason why the issue of a donor wanting to take back his
tissue sample has not yet presented itself. "The respondents were
more concerned with the security of the procedures and that secrecy
was maintained than in the kind of research for which their samples
179
were used."'
So long as citizens' privacy is maintained, the problem of who
owns the tissues may remain unanswered.
However, as more
information is obtained from genetic research on these tissue samples
and the results are made public, the donors may find themselves
stigmatized. For example, if a particular group of individuals is
found to be more likely to carry genes for a disease or disorder, those
individuals may be treated differently by social groups or employers.
In such situations, the citizens of Sweden may become interested in
reclaiming their tissues.

174.
Id. at 416-17.
175.
Id.
176.
An interesting comparison can be made to Denmark law where a donor who
wants her tissue sample returned to her is entitled to such an interest so long as she
has a justified reason for the return, such as treatment at another institution or
religious concerns over the tissue's use in research.
177.
Id.
178.
Id. at 416.
179.
Id.
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B. Iceland
Similar to Sweden, Iceland is one of few countries to have
specific tissue-banking legislation; however, Iceland's consent
requirements are more relaxed than Sweden's requirements.18 0 In
1998, Iceland's Parliament enacted legislation-the Act on a Health
Sector Database (HSD)-which created a national centralized
database of human tissue samples and accompanying personal health
and genetic data of Iceland's citizens1 81 The homogeneous nature of
Iceland's citizens, a relatively isolated group of individuals, makes
such a comprehensive tissue bank unique and incredibly desirable to
the scientific community.' 8 2 The goal of establishing the HSD was to
improve the health of Iceland's citizens through a database of "nonpersonally identifiable" health data. 8 3 The 1998 Act only regulates
the information, specifically declaring that it does not govern the
"storage or handling of, or access to, biological samples.' 18 4
The Act on Biobanks, enacted in 2000, regulates the storage and
handling of the tissue samples. 185 The donor informed-consent and
withdrawal provisions under this act represent a comparatively more
relaxed "middle-of-the-road" approach to tissue-banking procedures,
allowing for increased protection of donors while maintaining
feasibility for scientific researchers.1 8 6 In a non-clinical setting, the
Act requires a donor's voluntary informed consent for any tissues
collected for storage in a biobank.18 7 The donor must be told about
"the objective of the sample collection, the benefits, and risks
associated with its collection, and that the biological sample will be
permanently stored at a biobank for use. ' 88
A donor may withdraw his consent at any time, and
consequently, all of his stored tissues must be destroyed.' 8 9 However,

180.
Oosterhuis et al., supra note 19.
181.
Alice Hsieh, A Nation's Genes for a Cure to Cancer: Evolving Ethical,Social
and Legal Issues Regarding Population Genetic Databases, 37 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 359, 360 (2004).
182.
Id. at 370.
183.
Act on a Health Sector Database, No. 139/1998, art. 1 (1998) (Ice.),
available at http://eng.heilbrigdisraduneyti.is/laws-and-regulations//nr/ 659#kaflil.
184.
Id. art. II.
185.
Act
on Biobanks,
No.
110/2000
(2000)
(Ice.),
available at
http://eng.heilbrigdisraduneyti.is/laws-and-regulations/nr/31
[hereinafter
Act
on
Biobanks].
186.
Oosterhuis et al., supra note 19, at 75.
187.
See Act on Biobanks art. 7 ("In connection with collection of a biological
sample for preservation in a biobank, the free, informed consent of the person giving
the biological sample shall be sought.").
188.
Id.
189.
Id.; see also Regulations on the Keeping and Utilisation of Biological
Samples in Biobanks, No.
134/2001, art. 7 (2001) (Ice.), available at
http://eng.heilbrigdisraduneyti.isllaws-and-regulations/nr/684 [hereinafter Regulations
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"[m]aterial that has been produced from a biological sample by
performance of a study or the results of studies already carried out
shall ... not be destroyed."'190 Although the data from such studies
will not be destroyed, they must still be completely anonymized so
that any samples or findings from the studies cannot be traced back
to the donor. 19 1
Furthermore, the Act on Biobanks declares that neither the
biobank nor the specific individuals who take a donor's tissue own
that tissue. 192 The law specifically states that "[t]he [biobank] shall
not be counted as the owner of the biological samples, but has rights
over them, with the limitations laid down by law, and is responsible
for their handling being consistent with the provisions of this Act,
and of government directives based on it. '193 It then goes on to state
that the biobank cannot "pass the biological samples on to another
party, nor use them as collateral for financial liabilities, and they are
not subject to attachment for debt."' 94 These provisions offer donors a
strong position from which to claim they retain a property interest in
their donated tissues similar to the patients' claims in Catalona. If
neither the biobank nor the doctor may transfer a tissue sample, such
a choice may remain in the hands of the original donor.
Another interesting area of Icelandic biobank law surrounds the
concept of presumed consent.
The Biobank Act provides for a
presumption of consent for storage and further research using the
tissue samples collected from patients in connection with clinical
testing or treatment. 195 However, a donor remains free to "opt out,"
withdrawing from this presumed consent. 196 Once a donor provides

of Biological Samples] ("A donor of a biological sample may at any time withdraw
hislher consent for the preservation of a biological sample in a biobank and/or
participation in a scientific study.").
190.
Act on Biobanks art. 7; see also Regulations of Biological Samples, supra
note 189, art. 7.
On withdrawal of informed consent, the biological sample shall be destroyed,
i.e. samples of tissue, blood samples, cells and isolated genetic material
(DNAfRNA), and it is not permissible to carry out further tests on the sample,
whether the original biological sample or isolated parts of it, cells or genetic
material.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Regulations of Biological Samples, supra note 189, art. 7.
Act on Biobanks art. 10.
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 7.
See Regulations of Biological Samples, supra note 189, art. 8.

Should biological samples have been gathered in connection with clinical tests
or treatment, the presumed consent of the donor of the biological sample may
be assumed . . . for the biological sample to be stored in a biobank, provided
that this is stated in written information which is available to the donor of a
biological sample where the sample is taken ....
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the requisite notice of withdrawal to the Director General of Public
Health, tissue samples already collected from the donor can "only be
used in the interests of the donor of a biological sample or by his/her
specific permission.' 1 9 7 Therefore, the donor retains an interest in
her tissue and has a say in its future use, even if her tissue is
anonymized. 198
This same presumed consent provision applies to individuals
whose samples were entered into the HSD. 199 Iceland justifies such
presumed consent with the argument that donors' privacy interests
20 0
are protected because the information is coded and anonymized.
However, such an argument does not hold up under scrutiny;
although Iceland claims to be protecting the privacy of these donors,
it fails to protect their autonomy. The right to choose whether or not
one's own tissue will be stored and potentially used is of paramount
importance, and such a provision does not recognize that basic right
to choose.
A 2003 Icelandic
Supreme
Court ruling, Ragnhildur
Guomundsdottir v. The State of Iceland, held that the presumed
consent provision did not apply universally. 20 1 In this case, the
daughter of a deceased man argued that she had the right to prohibit
the transfer of her father's genetic information into the national
tissue database. 20 2 The court admitted that the HSD Act contains no
direct provisions giving relatives of a deceased individual the right to
prevent information about him being transferred to the HSD or
opting out of consent as described above. 203 However, the court
nevertheless found that an individual's constitutional right to privacy
includes genetic relationships, emphasizing the right to privacy and
20 4
individual autonomy especially in regards to consent procedures.
It was also noted that merely introducing the requirement that donor
information must not be able to be tracked to that individual donor
and the establishment of review boards does not ensure individuals'
privacy is protected in accordance with the country's constitutional
requirements.

197.
Act on Biobanks art. 7.
198.
C. Thomas, The Use and Control of Heel Prick Blood Samples, 24 MED. & L.
259, 261 (2005).
199.
Hsieh, supra note 181, at 378.
200. Id. at 379
201.
Ragnhildur Guomundsdottir v. The State of Iceland [Supreme Court] No.
151/2003 (2003).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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C. Denmark
In Denmark, the legal requirements for tissue research and the
20 5
related ethical issues are found in the nation's data protection law.
Denmark also included new provisions for regulating tissue banks in
the revised Act on Ethics Review in June 2003, and in the Patients
Rights Act in September 2004.206 Unlike both Sweden and Iceland,
where entirely new acts were passed, these updated provisions
merely add to existing ethical standards and tissue bank laws. 20 7 The
Patients Rights Act's 2004 amendment included provisions for
patients' self-determination in how their samples were used in
connection with their care or samples stored or developed by private
20 8
groups.
Denmark has also increased protection of patients' informed
consent rights with protections similar to those implemented in
Sweden.
Patients in Denmark must provide explicit informed
20 9
consent for their tissue to be collected for a research tissue bank.
However, if the tissue is going to a tissue bank for clinical work, the
patient's consent is presumed and an opt-out system has been put in
place. 210 Opt-out systems provide that patients be informed that
their tissue may be stored in a tissue bank for continued research,
and that the patients have a choice at that time to decline the option
to have their tissue stored. 211 Unlike the opt-out procedure, the
requirements for consent if the tissue is going to a privately-owned
tissue bank are much more stringent. In such cases, the patient and
tissue bank must actually enter into a written contract setting forth
each party's respective rights. 212 Furthermore, patients in Denmark
must also give their informed consent for any secondary use of their
tissue, and each new research project that will use a patient's tissue
must obtain approval from its respective ethics committee before it
213
can proceed.
Denmark has even more stringent laws regarding the patient's
right to withdraw her tissues after they have been put into a tissue
bank with the patient's initial consent. The patient must be informed
at the time her tissues are taken that she may withdraw her consent
at any time. 214 If a patient later desires to withdraw her consent, she

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
procedure).
212.
213.
214.

Baeyens et al., supra note 47.
Legislation Table 7, supranote 171.
See supra Part IV.A-B.
Legislation Table 7, supranote 171.
Id.
Nordic Table 7, supra note 18.
See Oosterhuis et al., supra note
Legislation Table 7, supranote 171.
Baeyens et al., supranote 47.
Legislation Table 7, supranote 171.

19, at 75 (explaining the opt-out
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may simply request that her sample be destroyed, and the tissue
bank must comply with her wishes. 215 Unlike other nations such as
the United States, where the Catalona court deemed anonymization
an appropriate remedy for a patient who desired to withdraw consent,
when a patient requests this destruction of the tissue in Denmark,
anonymization is insufficient.2 16 More notably, if the patient wants
the sample returned to her rather than destroyed, the tissue bank
must physically give it back to her so long as she has a justified
interest in getting it back. 217
Such an allowance provides for
extenuating circumstances where Denmark's lawmakers have
concluded that self-determination is more important than any future
interest in research that one particular tissue sample may offer.
However, public or private interests may override the patient's right
in having the tissue sample returned to her. 218 Thus, the system
allows for the balancing of different interests rather than rigid rules.
Neonatal screening offers an example of how Denmark's
nationwide requirements for the banking human tissue samples in
clinical tissue banks are implemented, ensuring the parents and
newborn child maintain their autonomy, privacy, and selfdetermination. Since 1982, all babies born in Denmark have a blood
sample taken for screening that is subsequently stored in a tissue
bank. 219 It is required under law for the parents to be provided with
written as well as verbal information regarding the blood sample
screening before any blood is taken from the baby. 220 Furthermore,
the purpose of the tissue bank where the blood sample will be stored
must be explained both verbally and in writing to the parents at the
22 1
same time.
Parents then have several options after becoming fully
informed. 222 First, parents have the right at the time the sample is
taken to opt out of their child's blood being stored at the tissue bank
in the first place. 223 However, should the parents opt out at this early
stage, no future screening on the child's blood could be done without

215.
Id.
216.
See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (finding
that since anonymization was a result of withdrawal stated in some of the patients'
consent forms, anonymization was an acceptable solution for patient withdrawal); see
also Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007) (affirming the reasoning
and findings of the district court).
217.
Legislation Table 7, supra note 171.
218.
Nordic Table 7, supra note 18.

219.

Nanette Elster, Future Uses of Residual Newborn Blood Spots: Legal and

Ethical Considerations,45 JURIMETRICS J. 179, 185 (2005).
220.
Id.
221.
Id.
222.
See id. (comparing the systematic nation-wide requirements of the Danish
system to the fragmented regulations of newborn screening tissue samples in the
United States where each state implements its own system).
223.
Id.
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taking another sample. Second, if parents do allow their newborn's
blood to be stored, all further screening and diagnosis beyond the
initial screening must be approved separately by the parents under
their informed consent. 224 This additional informed consent is
required with each new use or test on the stored tissue. 225 Finally,
parents have the option to withdraw the physical blood sample at any
time after it is stored.2 26 Such an option to take back the physical
sample in the future implies that the child, and thus the parents as
guardians, retain an interest in that sample despite the fact that they
227
have allowed it to be stored at the tissue bank.
D. An InternationalProposal:The Council of Europe
The Council of Europe promulgated guidelines in 2002 for the
use of stored human tissues and informed consent in biomedical
research. 228 The Council of Europe, first established as a result of
The Hague Congress in 1948, consists of forty-three countries,
including many nations not in the European Union. 229
The
guidelines were built on principles of the Convention of Human
Rights and Biomedicine as well as the Protocol on Biomedical
Research, and assert the purpose of protecting human rights, dignity,
and self-determination with respect to medical research which uses
230
stored human tissues.
The main principle of the proposal declares that tissues which
remain identifiable (non-anonymized) cannot be used for any purpose
other than that for which they were initially removed unless the
patient's informed consent is obtained. 231 Thus, without the patient's
consent, the tissue may not be used for any secondary research not

224.
Id.
225.
See id. (mentioning that approval by an ethics committee is also required in
addition to the parents' consent for a new use or test on the sample).
226.
Id.
227.
Another example of the high protection of an individual's property rights in
a neonatal blood sample is found in New Zealand. New Zealand requires every child
born in New Zealand must have a "heel prick" blood sample test between 48 and 72
hours after birth, similar to Denmark's testing. Parents of these children, or even the
children themselves when they become competent, have the right to demand the return
of their sample. The number of requests for returned samples has risen from none in
1995 to 775 in 2003. See generally Thomas, supra note 198 (suggesting that the rights
these individuals retain in their tissue samples demonstrate that such samples should
be considered the property of the human sources from which they were excised and
that research use of the samples without consent should be prohibited).
228.
Id. at 273 (noting that the guidelines were released in October 2002 for
public comment).
229.
Baeyens et al., supra note 47, at n.18.
230.
See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 198, at 273; Baeyens et al., supra note 47.
231.
Baeyens et al., supra note 47.
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covered by the original informed consent. 232 However, the guidelines
do not apply to anonymized tissues, allowing nations who ratify the
the
guidelines to simply anonymize tissues in order to circumvent
233
requirements for obtaining the patient's informed consent.
Although this approach intends to protect human dignity and
self-determination, allowing the simple anonymization of tissue to
evade the Council's substantive protections does not further such
goals. Sweden, Iceland, and Denmark offer patients even greater
protection of dignity, autonomy, and self-determination. However, it
is important for the Council of Europe and other international bodies
to continue putting forth proposals in this area and to encourage
nations not only to comment publicly, but also to ratify the proposal
to establish widespread international minimum standards.

V. PROPOSAL
The United States' regulations and common law development as
described above are simply inadequate to achieve the appropriate
balance between protecting patients' autonomy and promoting
scientific research. The Moore, Greenberg, and Catalona decisions
demonstrate that the courts are forging a path of precedent that
consistently allows research to outweigh the patient's dignity,
autonomy, and self-determination. Unfortunately, these rulings have
yet to elicit a national response. Such a response is imperative if the
United States wants to find a more reasonable balance between
individuals' rights and the furtherance of scientific research. Both
interests are important, and to strike this balance, new solutions
must be implemented, looking to countries such as Sweden, Iceland,
and Denmark for guidance.
The United States comprehensively regulates informed consent,
and a patient must be informed of his right to withdraw from
scientific research. 234 However, this informed consent loses its value
if the right to withdraw is restricted merely to refusing to give
additional tissue samples to the research; the full right to withdraw
or destroy the already excised tissue sample itself is necessary to
provide individuals with the self-determination they deserve. The
systems of Sweden, Iceland, and Denmark all place a very high value
on the patient's rights, allowing the patient to destroy or anonymize
any samples she has provided in the past. Each country provides a
slightly different rule for a patient's decision to withdraw, but all the

232.
233.
234.
IRBs).

Thomas, supra note 198.
Id.
See supra Part I.A (discussing requirements of informed consent and
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rules carry the same common theme: the patient retains an interest
in his tissue, and thus may call for the return, destruction, or
anonymization of that tissue at any time.
The United States should incorporate this theme into a national
framework for regulating tissue banks. Furthermore, the United
States should go a step beyond these nations by allowing only for
return or destruction-not anonymization-of a patient's withdrawn
sample. Anonymization of a tissue sample is simply insufficient to
fully protect a patient's interests. There are three reasons why deidentification does not accomplish anonymity of the tissue. First,
"anonymizing" tissue is a misleading term because although the
anonymization process requires that the patient's name and identity
no longer be linked with the sample, it cannot ever fully strip the
tissue of its connection to the person from whom it was taken. 23 5 The
tissue contains the individual's unique DNA, the most basic level of
human identity. As science and technology progress and scientists
understand more about the details of each person's specific DNA
strains, DNA will likely become even more closely identified with
human identity.
Second, anonymization is insufficient as a solution to a patient's
wish to withdraw his tissue sample because the patient's family
members will be unable to have further access to the tissues once
they are anonymized. For example, the research in Catalona dealt
specifically with prostate cancer. If the tissues taken from the men
with prostate cancer were anonymized, the patients' children,
grandchildren, and other decedents would not be able to access
information from the original tissue that might provide them
important insight into their own future health.
As scientific
screening tests improve, such samples will become more important in
informing family members whether they will be subject to the same
disease or health problems of the patient who initially provided the
sample.
Third, even if an individual's tissue is anonymized, a group or
individual may still be stigmatized or offended if the nature of the
research violates his intent in originally providing the sample. Often
scientific research will examine a specific definable group or
population, and even if tissues are not linked to any one individual,
when the research results are released, they may have a negative
impact on the group as a whole, and thus the individual who provided
tissue as a member of that group. 236 For example, the Havasupai

235.
See Andrews, supra note 73, at 24 ("Now that DNA typing is available
which can identify individuals, samples cannot ever be truly anonymized.").
236.
See id. (describing potential discrimination against the tissue source not
because of one's individual identity, but because of a characteristic revealed about him
as a member of a group).
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tribe has sued Arizona State University (ASU) for misusing the tribemembers' blood samples in their scientific research. 2 37 The scientists
claimed to collect the tribe-members blood samples for studies on
diabetes, but in fact performed research on schizophrenia and
inbreeding. 238 Although the providers of the tissue samples in this
case did not have their samples anonymized, the end result of the
ASU research demonstrates the potentially stigmatizing effect of
research results. The tribe-members suing ASU claim that such
research was stigmatizing to them and that the research itself
conflicted with their religious beliefs. 23 9 Each member of that tribe is
now linked to the findings of schizophrenia and inbreeding, even
though they never wanted to participate in such research in the first
place. Even if those tissues were not linked to any particular
individuals, they remain linked to the group, which was subsequently
stigmatized when the findings were released.
The United States must also implement a system of tissue bank
regulation that prevents trust in the doctor/patient relationship from
dissolving further.
Maintaining trust in the doctor/patient or
researcher/patient relationship is essential to the medical profession,
yet as patients learn more about their surrendered rights to tissues,
that trust begins to dissolve. Most patients are not even aware that
the tissues they have donated will be used for purposes beyond
diagnosis, instead assuming that they will be thrown out as
hazardous waste. However, as court holdings such as Catalona
emerge in the headlines, the public will learn that this is certainly
240
not the case.
Because of the nature of the medical profession, patients often
place a great deal of trust in their doctor. Doctors hold all the
pertinent specialized knowledge, while most patients have little or no
knowledge about the medical and scientific consequences of their
condition. The patient trusts that the doctor will act in her best
interest, and if the patient later finds out this is not the case, that
trust begins to erode. When patients sign inforrmed consent forms
just before undergoing surgery, allowing their tissues to be banked,
they may not fully comprehend the potential issues that may arise in
the future when they find out they have no right to declare how those

237.
Nicole Saidi, Tribe Files $50M Suit Against ASU, ASU WEB DEVIL, Mar.
22, 2004, http://www.asuwebdevil.com/issues/2004/O3/22/news/637571 (last visited Mar.

7, 2008).
238.

Lri Andrews, Havasupai Tribe Sues Genetic Researchers, in WHO OWNS

YouR BODY: POLICY CHALLENGES FOR HUMAN RESEARCH AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 23
(Inst. on Biotechnology & the Human Future, 2006).
239.
Id.
240.
See Skloot, supra note 1, at 38 (referring to the RAND study which showed
hundreds of millions of tissue samples are put into tissue banks every year in the
United States).
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tissues should or should not be used. A patient is at his most
vulnerable and emotional just before surgery, and he may depend on
the withdrawal language as a safeguard for his protection. That
protection should not later be reduced to carry no meaning from the
patient's perspective.
Furthermore,
patients
generally
expect that
medical
professionals, hospitals, and research institutions will use their
tissues for good purposes, but how each patient defines "good" may be
slightly different.
When the patient later realizes that her
expectations have not been met, the patient may feel discouraged or
even betrayed by the medical professionals who have used her tissue
for purposes to which they may not have initially consented.
Such an erosion of trust would be unfortunate because it could
result in patients becoming less willing to participate in medical and
scientific research. 241 Research participation is important to the
progress of medicine and often beneficial to public health, such as
when new drugs and therapies are developed to treat diseases and
harmful conditions. Therefore, in order to avoid this deterioration,
certain safeguards must be put into place to protect patients'
interests while also providing for the use of human tissues in the
progress of scientific research.
One possible approach to protect patients' autonomy and selfdetermination, different from those used in Sweden, Iceland, and
Denmark, is the use of a charitable trust framework as a legal
solution for ensuring that patients retain some control over their
tissues. 242 Black's Law Dictionary defines a trust as "[a] property
interest held by one person (the trustee) at the request of another (the
settlor) for the benefit of a third party (the beneficiary).'24 3 The
property interest is conveyed to the trustee through the trust only "as
a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it. '244 Since the
trustee of the trust has a legal duty to use the property in the interest
of the beneficiary, the property remains protected. 245 Thus, a patient
who provides tissue to a research institution would be considered the
beneficiary, and the research institution holds title to the tissue as
trustee, subject to the obligation to use the tissue for the benefit of
246
the patient beneficiary.

241.
See Thomas, supra note 198, at 276 n.49 (mentioning an example of lost
trust in medical professionals in an organ retention scandal in New Zealand where
children's hearts were banked without consent after their autopsies).
242.
David E. Winickoff & Larissa B. Neumann, Towards a Social Contract for
Genomics: Property and the Public in the "Biotrust"Model, 1 GENOMICS, SOC'Y & POL'Y
8 (2005), available at http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fss/journals/gsp/docs/volumelnumber3/
dwgspvollno32005.pdf.
243.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (8th ed. 2004).

244.

Id.

245.
246.

Winickoff & Neumann, supra note 243, at 10.
Id.
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A charitable trust, a subset of the general category of trusts
described above, must actually be "charitable," aiming at the benefit
of the general public or charity rather than the benefit of an
individual. 247 Under this framework, as patients continue to provide
their tissues for use in scientific research, these tissues would simply
be held for the benefit of public health. Although charitable trusts
require a class of individuals, not the general public, to be designated
as beneficiaries, 248 medical professionals and patients may be able to
contract around this requirement in the conveyance of the tissues to
the trust.
The charitable trust model would require that the tissue samples
be used according to the terms of the trust, with the institution as the
trustee enforcing this use. This model would allow the patient to
retain some control over the use of the tissue, and the patient would
potentially be able to withdraw the sample so long as the trust
relationship is revocable. 249 A revocable trust is one "in which the
settlor reserves the right to terminate the trust and recover the trust
property." 250 Although the charitable trust structure may not solve
all current deficiencies in tissue regulation and may present new
areas of conflict, this structure would provide patients with the
autonomy, security, self-determination, and trust that the current
regulations fail to protect.

VI. CONCLUSION

The United States' regulations and common law developments in
Moore, Greenberg,and Catalona are simply inadequate to achieve the
appropriate balance between protecting patients' autonomy and
further promoting scientific research.
These courts' rulings are
undervaluing the notions of individual autonomy and selfdetermination that the U.S. holds dear.
Sweden, Iceland, and
Denmark have made greater strides in protecting these basic human
tenets in the context of tissue banks through the implementation of
comprehensive national policies. The United States should look to
these nations for guidance in forming its own uniform national policy,
as our current legal landscape regulating tissue banks will remain
fragmented so long as it develops out of sporadic common law
precedents. A legislatively enacted nationwide legal structure would
help ensure a uniform approach among courts addressing tissue bank
issues and aid in striking an appropriate balance between the

247.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1547.

248.
249.

Winickoff & Neumann, supranote 243, at 10.
Id.

250.

BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1551.
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recognition of patients' rights and the promotion of scientific
research.
However, many issues must still be explored and analyzed. Most
importantly, more information regarding human tissue samples and
tissue banks must be provided to the public, allowing for increased
awareness of individuals' rights, or lack thereof. The broader the
public comprehension of tissue-banking, the greater the chance that
patients will make truly informed decisions when giving informed
consent to have their tissues banked. Other issues presently remain
unanswered. What will be the impact of more restrictive regulation
of tissue banks on future scientific research? Will individuals who
provide tissues truly benefit if the tissue bank system becomes more
strictly regulated? What practical administrative problems need to
be overcome to implement the proposal of a charitable trust structure
of tissue donation and are the solutions feasible? Looking to the
future, however, these concerns should not prevent the United States
from immediately implementing new regulations that will protect
tissue providers' dignity, autonomy, and self-determination.
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